Data protection regulations give individuals rights to obtain the information that entities have on them. However, providing such information can also reveal aspects of the entity's underlying technical infrastructure and organizational processes. This article explores the security implications this raises and highlights the need to consider such in rights in fulfillment processes.
I
n recent years, we have seen multiple security incidents and unauthorized data disclosures. As a result, awareness of cybersecurity issues has been increasing, and security has become a board-level concern. 8 It is understandable that companies wish to protect themselves against crime, attacks, and other sources of security problems. Avoiding the fallout of security breaches, in terms of interruption, reputational damage, and financial loss, is a major concern.
There are also drivers from the legal requirements around data security. In particular, European data protection law requires that those responsible for processing personal data (data controllers) implement data protection principles in system design and take appropriate technical and organizational security measures to guard against the risks of data breaches. The same law also provides for various rights of individuals (data subjects) with regard to personal data relating to them, including the right to obtain details regarding their personal data and, in certain circumstances, to transfer some data to another data controller.
Others have considered the relationship among data protection by design requirements, privacy concerns, and subject access rights. 14 This revealed a tradeoff made by some data controllers in the pursuit of the principle of data protection by design, which is often viewed shortsightedly, inadvertently, or perhaps deliberately by data controllers solely as a confidentiality problem to be addressed by privacy-enhancing technologies. Taking this narrow rather than a more holistic approach to data protection resulted in hindering data subjects from exercising their rights.
In this article, we consider aspects of data subject rights in relation to security in the context of the European Union's (EU's) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 5 Specifically, we explore security aspects as they relate to the individuals involved in a particular exercise of rights and also those regarding controller obligations. The first of these concerns the potential security issues resulting from the process of exercising and fulfilling these rights, an area of which there appears to be some awareness. The second includes potential security issues resulting from the data provided in response to rights requests and what that might reveal about the data controller's technical infrastructure and organizational processes. Generally, the security implications for controllers in fulfilling rights do not appear to be widely considered.
Overall, we argue that in meeting data subject rights (focusing on the rights of access and portability), data controllers need to also consider any security risks in fulfilling such rights, in particular how they relate to making disclosures about the controller's technical infrastructure or organizational processes. However, as we emphasize, this is not a tradeoff: data controllers must both fulfill data subject rights and meet security obligations. Failure to do so can have consequences for controllers, not only by way of potentially significant penalties and other regulatory sanctions but also more broadly through reputational harm, loss of business, financial damage, and so forth. By raising awareness of these issues, our aim is to encourage the development of practices and mechanisms that facilitate the exercise of data subject rights while also ensuring the security of data and processing activities.
GDPR: Rights and Obligations
The GDPR establishes a legal framework governing the processing of personal data. Personal data are any information relating to an individual who can be identified, either directly or indirectly, from those data (or from those data in combination with other data) [GDPR Art. 4(1)]. Personal data may not only include names, addresses, ID numbers, and so on, but they can also potentially encapsulate device IDs, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses (dynamic or static), online identifiers, and a range of other data relating to the specific characteristics of the individual. The GDPR defines processing as any operation performed on personal data, including collection, storage, retrieval, consultation, alteration, adaptation, and use [Art. 4(2) ].
Under the GDPR, any natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or other body involved in processing personal data acts as a data controller or as a data processor. Data controllers are the entities that determine the means and purposes of processing [Art. 4(7) ]. Data processors are any entity that processes personal data on behalf of and under the direction of a data controller [Art. 4(8) and Art. 28(3)], and they should assist data controllers to meet their obligations [Art. 28(3)(f)].
A Basis in Rights
Under EU law, data protection is considered to be a fundamental right distinct from and of equal significance to the right to privacy. 1 While the GDPR came into force in 2018 and brought increased attention to the subject, data protection as a concept and as a right has a long history. 13 GDPR, in expanding upon the fundamental right to data protection as established in the Charter, affords several rights to data subjects (the individuals to whom personal data relate) [Art. 4(1) ]. These rights are summarized in Figure 1 . While other rights may have security implications (for example, where data subjects make targeted erasure requests), our focus here is on those rights that, upon their exercise, generally result in the transfer of data from data controller to data subject: the right of access (Art. 15) and the right to portability (Art. 20).
The right of access (sometimes called subject access) provides that data subjects have a right to be told whether a data controller is processing personal data relating to them and, when that is the case, access to that personal data and to an array of other information (Art. 15). This information includes, among other things, the purposes of processing, the categories of personal data being processed, the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the personal data have been disclosed, and the period for which the data will be stored. To fulfill this right, the data controller should provide a copy of the personal data being processed, but this should not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.
The right to portability is a more limited and qualified right than the right of access. It establishes that data subjects have the right to receive, in a structured, commonly used, and machine-readable format, the personal data that they have provided to a data controller or to transmit that data to another controller without hindrance from the original controller (Art. 20). This right applies where the data are being processed either with the data subject's consent or as part of a contract between him or her and the data controller and only where the processing is being carried out by automatic means.
Obligations Imposed: Rights and Security
As well as providing for these rights, the GDPR imposes various obligations on data controllers and processors, both in relation to fulfilling data subject rights and to security. These obligations come with potentially severe penalties for failures to comply.
Data controllers are under an obligation to facilitate data subjects in exercising their rights and to fulfill requests to exercise those rights (Art. 12). In relation to subject access and portability requests, they must provide information without undue delay and in a concise, transparent, intelligible, and easily accessible form [Art. 12 (1) ]. This can be done in writing or electronically. Data controllers can only refuse to fulfill these requests if they can show that they are not in a position to identify the data subject (Art. 11).
Security is also a core data protection principle [Art. 5(1)(f)]. Data controllers and processors are obliged to take technical and organizational security measures appropriate for managing the risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons incurred in processing personal data (Art. 32). In assessing the risks incurred in processing, particular attention should be paid to the risks of accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, and unauthorized disclosure of, or access to personal data. Technical and organizational measures could include, depending on the risks, for example, pseudonymization and encryption of personal data; ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and resilience of processing systems; clearly defined staff roles, policies, and procedures; and processes for routinely testing and evaluating the effectiveness of technical and organizational security measures [Art 32 (1) ].
The GDPR's enforcement regime provides a strong incentive for controllers to manage data properly, meet security obligations, and fulfill data subject rights. Indeed, the possibility of fines of up to €20 million or 4% of global turnover (whichever is greater) [Art. 83(5)] has captured mainstream attention. This penalty regime is applicable only for certain types of violations, including failures to fulfill data subject rights, and fines of higher levels of severity are likely to be imposed only for the most serious and sustained breaches. For a failure to meet other obligations, including those relating to security, fines of up to €10 million or 2% of global turnover (whichever is greater) may be imposed [Art. 83(4)]. Regulators also have various other enforcement powers in addition to fines, including ordering data controllers to fulfill data subjects rights, demanding that data controllers bring their processing operations into compliance within a specified period, and banning data controllers from processing personal data [Art. 58(2)(f)] The latter, in particular, may have severe consequences for data controllers.
Considerations in Fulfilling Rights Requests
Individuals exercising their rights can represent a serious undertaking. This means that a data controller improperly handling a request can have significant implications for the individuals involved. For instance, access and portability requests typically reveal a sizeable quantity of sensitive information: in a portability context, potentially including all relevant data ever given to the provider, and in an access context, potentially including data that have not been given by the subject to the data controller. Such data often represent far more than what are ordinarily accessible through general means (e.g., use of that service). Similar concerns are also relevant to other rights, e.g., the right of erasure might result in serious damage to an individual if actioned incorrectly.
Data subject rights under GDPR
Art. 15 Right of access: The right to have their personal data provided to them ("subject access request").
Art. 16 Right to rectification: The right to correct inaccurate personal data.
Art. 17 Right to erasure: A qualified right to require erasure of their personal data ("right to be forgotten").
Art. 18 Right to restriction: A qualified right to restrict the processing of their personal data.
Art. 20 Right to portability: A qualified right to transfer their personal data to another data controller.
Art. 21 Right to object: A qualified right to require the data controller to stop processing their personal data.
Art. 22 Automated decision making: The right to not be subject to solely automated decision making, which produces legal or similarly significant effects.
Figure 1.
The data subject rights provided under the GDPR. The qualified rights can be exercised when certain conditions are met (e.g., where processing is taking place under a particular specified legal basis).
It follows that there are security considerations for controllers regarding the handling of a rights request, including relating to the validation of the requester's identity, processing of the request itself, and the means by which the result is returned. Indeed, a controller fulfilling a data subject's rights would itself constitute processing and would be subject to the same security requirements as any other form of processing.
User Authentication
It is important for a controller to verify the identity of the individual making the request. Means for authentication are paramount for ensuring the requestor is who he or she claim and should be employed before any request is acted upon. If the data controller has reasonable doubts about the identity of a data subject, it is permitted to request further information to assist identification [Art. 12(6) ].
Data can be processed where the identity of the data subject may not be (directly) known. Where the controller can demonstrate that this is the case, he or she are not obliged to acquire or process additional personal data solely for the purpose of identification (Art. 11). However, he or she may not refuse additional data offered by the data subject to assist with identification (Recital 57). We have previously argued that mobile platforms should provide means, including those facilitating identification, to assist subjects in exercising their rights against app developers. 11 In a digital context, data subjects should normally be able to use their usual credentials to authenticate and prove their identity (Recital 57). At a minimum, where the data subject can log in to a service using his or her credentials, authentication for fulfilling access and portability requests should at the very least maintain the same level of security as for the normal user login process. In some cases, where the data involved may be particularly revealing, it could be good practice to employ means for more stringent authentication. When more than one method of contacting the data subject is available, the use of multifactor authentication (perhaps coupled with request validation, which is discussed later) may be appropriate. 9 However, data controllers should be aware that they can only use reasonable means to identify data subjects, particularly in the context of online services (Recital 64). According to the guidance 7 from the U.K.'s data protection regulator, the Information Commissioner's Office, reasonableness will depend on the circumstances. Where the identity of the requester is known to the data controller, for example, it should not request substantially more information (perhaps particularly where the data controller has an ongoing relationship with the requester). On the other hand, where there is some reasonable uncertainty about the identity of the requester, the data controller would be prudent to request identifying information; for example, if the requester uses an email address known to the data controller but requests that the personal data be sent to a postal address other than the one on file. The potential harm caused by inappropriate disclosure (by way of fulfilling a rights request) should also be a consideration in assessing reasonableness, which can include whether the personal data involved are particularly revealing. Note that while this guidance relates to the subject access process prior to the GDPR, the reasonableness requirement is substantively the same.
Controllers are therefore not permitted to require data subjects to submit to unreasonable identification processes, such as providing more information than would be necessary to confirm their identity. This means that, if adopting an additional level of security for authenticating users for access and portability requests, data controllers must ensure that they do not impose a burden on data subjects seeking to exercise their rights or request excessive identifying information.
Processing the Request
In some contexts, good practice may entail further validation to confirm that it was in fact the subject who made the request. 11 For instance, in an online context, emailing a confirmation link to the account's registered email address can help avoid situations where someone's account with the service (but not their email) was compromised, or where a login session was hijacked after a failure to logout of a shared machine, due to an unlocked phone, and so forth.
Once the subject's identity and request have been validated, the next step is to ensure an appropriate response. While controllers are obliged to fulfill requests, they are permitted to refuse requests where they are manifestly unfounded or excessive [Art. 12(5) ]. This provides a means, for example, to prevent something of a denial of service by way of repetitive requests. If controllers refuse to fulfill a request on these grounds, they are obliged to give reasons demonstrating that this is the case [Art. 12(5) and Recital 59]. Note that data subjects are not and should not be obliged to state their motives in making a request. In practice, controllers may find other factors indicative of malicious or spurious requests, including the character and timing of the requests, particularly those that are frequently repeated. Naturally, it is important for controllers to have processes in place to ensure the proper handling of the request, that the data requested relate to the data subject, and that, through quality assurance, data are validated before being returned. While this seems exceedingly obvious, data breaches have resulted from improperly handling rights requests. In one reported example, the results of an access request included the data pertaining to a different individual that had also made a request. 15 
Protecting the Response
The mechanism by which responses to subject requests are delivered also warrants attention. As discussed, the results of a right of access or portability request are potentially revealing, not only because the data they include are inherently personal but also because this information represents an aggregation of personal data. Having access to all of one's interactions on a social media platform over a period of time, for instance, provides information beyond what is accessible through general use of the account, by revealing information of hidden (e.g., deleted) messages, blocked contacts, and so on.
As such, measures by which responses are protected or that reduce the risk of data leakage warrant consideration by controllers. Simply emailing a response (e.g., unencrypted) to the user's registered email address might be convenient and acceptable in some circumstances, but it is arguably insufficient in othersespecially if data relate to financial matters, special categories of personal data, and so on.
Less common are the means to protect the data once they move off the platform. This is not an explicit obligation for the controller but is useful from a security point of view. One example might be to deliver the archive in an encrypted form with a user-specified password so that even if the archive is leaked, its contents may still have some degree of protection.
Implementation
It appears that some organizations have given consideration to such issues. Our experience in exercising our rights with various organizations has provided evidence of some common measures being taken, including the following:
1. ensuring that the request and download of information occurs through the controller's platform, meaning that users are validated through the platform's standard access control procedures (note, however, that requests made via another method, for example, by email, must still be fulfilled) 2. sending an email to the account's registered address notifying that a request has been made, and sometimes requiring that user confirm the request, as a means for alerting data subjects and mitigating any issues should their account (and thus the request, though not their email) be compromised 3. having the information archive only downloadable or a short time after the request to restrict the possibility for distribution or future leakage.
A confirmation step seems more appropriate than simply alerting because it gives some extra assurance that the data subject actually made the request, while discouraging opportunism (e.g., someone leaving a machine logged-in). On one social media platform, we observed that an email was sent immediately on request, notifying that the request was made through their platform and stating that the account may be compromised if this request was unfamiliar. The time from receiving the request notification until the entire information archive became available was ~19 min, and the archive was directly accessible through the platform (no email access required). This gives very little time for a user to respond and take action against a request he or she did not make.
Organizational Security Concerns
The security considerations that were just described concern the protection of personal data related to making and fulfilling a request. In these cases, where a failure occurs, the data breach (or other issue) typically concerns and impacts those data subjects to whom the request (or response) relates. There is some awareness of these problems, as is illustrated by guidance on related issues produced by supervisory authorities (e.g., data protection regulators) around, for example, identity verification, 7 the GDPR recitals, and so forth. Less discussed in a rights context, however, are the potential security risks facing the controller. The data returned as part of an access or portability request might reveal aspects of the controller's technical infrastructure and its implementation, and could also indicate the nature of the organizational processes that are in place. Revealing such information can pose a security risk because it may help in facilitating a cyberattack.
This bears consideration, not because a security incident affecting the controller can be systemic and result in harms at scale. This has direct data protection implications. For example, a security breach might leak data on all data subjects [as opposed to just those relating to a request (see the section "Considerations in Fulfilling Rights Requests")]. Note also that security issues extend beyond data protection, e.g., where issues of system downtime can impact users, possibly with significant consequences, such as where the service represents some critical infrastructure.
Cyberreconnaissance
Information gathering is an important stage of a cyberattack. That is, knowledge about a potential target-be it of the target's technical infrastructure or organizational processes-helps facilitate an attack. 3 Having information about the technology employed (for instance, the software used and version numbers, network configuration, open ports, and so forth) might reveal attack vectors, exploitable systems to target once the organization is infiltrated, and potentially the countermeasures or protections employed. Similarly, knowledge of the social and business practices of an organization can guide strategy around the means for the attack, 4 expected response time, investigative capability, vulnerable business processes, susceptible staff, and so forth.
At a technical level, it is common for networks to provide the means for nefarious information gathering purposes because a network renders a remote system reachable. Major technology service providers report thousands of potential cyberincidents each day, often detecting the use of automated tools that scan and probe both for information about the host being queried and to indicate potential vulnerabilities (for example, outdated software, improper configuration, and so on). Note that such techniques are used defensively (e.g., by organizations seeking to improve their security) and offensively (e.g., by cybercriminals). Toward this, various intrusion detection and prevention tools involve monitoring to uncover and mitigate imminent threats (including reconnaissance efforts) or actual security violations. 12 Such operations might be targeted at a specific organization or could be more scattergun, e.g., where a whole series of network addresses could be probed to find potential targets.
However, not all information-gathering methods are technical. 4 Cybercriminal operations are known to use people as part of their attack strategy. This could involve social engineering (i.e., deceiving a staff member to reveal particular information or to take an action), 10 a malicious insider, who may be bribed or extorted, or perhaps a plant employed specifically to facilitate an attack. 6 
Exposing the Organization
In this rights context, an interesting consideration is that a controller, by providing information, could potentially expose the underlying technology and processes of the organization. In other words, there is the potential that the information provided by fulfilling access and portability requests could assist cyberreconnaissance. Indeed, these data access rights present a new method for information gathering, by creating a legal obligation to provide information that could expose deep-organizational internals-information that would otherwise be generally inaccessible externally or difficult to obtain.
Of course, any risk depends on circumstances and, in particular, the nature of the request and information returned in the controller's response. That said, there appears to be little discussion of such risks, meaning that organizations may well be, inadvertently, leaking information that might have security implications. The fact that controllers are providing direct data exports from technical components 2,15 suggests these aspects have had little consideration.
Illustrating Some Risks. We now illustrate some of the possible risks that might result from the responses to access and portability requests. Our discussion here is only indicative, and again, any risks will depend on the particular circumstances.
First, the response can indicate the software, services, and technologies used, particularly where the data form an extract directly from a technical system. Such details might be revealed directly or indirectly, e.g., through metadata included in a report describing the package or version number, as a screenshot where the interface suggests the software used, or perhaps where certain data structures and formats imply the use of particular products or services (Figure 2 ). Such information could assist technical attacks, where knowledge of the software stack and its vulnerabilities might facilitate an exploit. It can also provide the background for facilitating spear phishing attacks (attacks targeting particular staff members, e.g., through fake emails about or resembling those common to the application used), social engineering (e.g., by masquerading as technical support with detailed knowledge of the software used), and other forms of deception. 10 Another consideration is whether the data returned can indicate some of the risk mitigation measures that the controller employs. For instance, if logging/audit records are revealed (as they often should be if they are associated with a data subject), it can indicate some of the organization's security strategy: Are failed logins recorded? Do such records include the IP address? Is every input made throughout their web application recorded? These aspects can influence a would-be attacker's strategy. For instance, if few records appear to be kept, a bolder systems interrogation approach might be encouraged because it suggests a lack of capability by the organization to detect and investigate such an attack.
It is reportedly common that a direct extract (dump) from the database is returned with a request. 2 In addition to including the personal data, generally such information will also reveal the database schema-the way information is structured-including the fields of data recorded and their names, while the data themselves can suggest the fields' data types. The example presented in Figure 2 shows how a schema reveals the software used, which, as discussed earlier, can have implications.
The schema might also reveal some of the security measures employed. As mentioned previously, database tables or fields that appear dedicated to logging or audit might indicate the aspects of an application being monitored (and the aspects that are not , and so on, revealing this indicates the background information assisting in the impersonation of a particular target.
From a technical perspective, knowledge of the schema, while not directly an attack vector itself, can provide the background to assist in enabling system compromises. One common attack type is injection, 4 which essentially involves running malicious queries against a datastore. These queries can entail reads (information leaks) or writes (modification and deletion). Although injection attacks are well known and are mitigated by best practices, they still represent an extremely common vulnerability, with the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security recognizing them as the dominant form of web application attack. 4 As datastore queries execute in line with the datastore's schema, knowledge of the schema can enable attacks (either through injection or some other vector) to be more focused and streamlined through predefined and targeted queries.
These represent only a few examples of some potential security implications of rights requests that reveal the controller's underlying systems infrastructure. Again, any risks depend on the specific circumstances, including the type of request, data actually returned, the technical stack, organizational processes, and so forth.
Discussion
The GDPR's data subject rights reflect the human rights foundations of EU data protection law. They exist to inform and empower people in relation to their personal data. As such, fulfilling rights, including the right of access and right to portability, is an extremely important aspect of GDPR compliance. Generally, organizational security concerns do not and cannot trump data subject access rights, and must not pose a barrier to exercising rights. This means that data controllers should consider how access and portability rights requests can be fulfilled in a way that is fully compliant with the GDPR's requirements but also minimizes the associated security risks. We now consider some potential ways forward.
Raising Awareness
Data controllers, as part of their security obligations, should consider the security aspects of fulfilling data subject rights. This cannot mean using security as a reason to not fully comply with requests. However, it should mean that data controllers are aware of and take steps to mitigate potential security risks that could arise in doing so. In other words, controllers need to adopt a security-oriented mind-set in complying with access and portability requests.
To date, there appears to be little awareness of the security implications for the controller in fulfilling rights requests. Not only is there scant discussion of such issues, but from work analyzing rights responses, it also seems that many controllers are reactive in their approach to fulfilling rights requests. For instance, providing data dumps from technical systems 2, 15 suggests that rigorous assessments of the risks to an organization of fulfilling a rights request (in a particular way) were not undertaken.
It may well be that many controllers, perhaps driven by a rush to comply, were fairly ad hoc in their responses, and they may not have yet defined rights fulfilment processes, let alone subjected them to a rigorous security analysis. It is also conceivable that the rights requests were fulfilled by a team or business unit that does not ordinarily conduct security risk assessments and did not consult with those undertaking such assessments. One may expect such issues to occur more with smaller firms because larger firms may be more likely to have in-house security expertise, measures for evaluating new business operational processes, and so on. However, issues may also arise by virtue of larger firms often having a number of fragmented business groups, giving more scope for things to slip through the cracks.
Regardless of the reasons, as we have outlined, there can be risks in the way rights requests are served. As Figure 2 . A subset of (masked) customer information extracted from a database, in which aspects of the database schema are visible. A web search based on the field names provided makes clear that this represents the use of a popular e-commerce software package. This information could then be used to facilitate an attack, for instance, through a known vulnerability in that software package, by aiding social engineering, and so on.
id login username usertype password title firstname lastname invalid_login_ attempts * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * such, there is a real need to raise awareness of these issues, so that controllers can engineer their rights fulfilment processes to account for possible security concerns. Indeed, this is a key aim of this article. One starting point might be through information provided by supervisory authorities. As mentioned, these authorities already issue guidance on fulfilling rights requests. 7 Having guidance documents that also indicate that fulfilling subjects' rights requests can bring security risks could alert and encourage those dealing with requests to consider such issues and seek advice and expertise where necessary.
Mode of Presentation
GDPR provides for rights of access and portability in relation to eligible personal data that are being processed. However, in fulfilling these requests, the data provided to data subjects need not necessarily directly reflect the underlying technical infrastructure so long as all of the required data are, in fact, provided. At its simplest level, controllers will often not need to provide the actual table headers, database schema, software metadata (name, version number), and other potentially revealing information. In some cases, security concerns could mean that obfuscating the underlying technical infrastructure in some way is a necessary measure to help data controllers continue to meet their security-related obligations under the GDPR.
The need to consider the security implications of providing responses to rights requests could also result in making the responses more useful. This could potentially incentivize data controllers to find ways to present the data provided in response to subject access requests in such a way as to be more understandable and intuitive for data subjects. At a basic level, this could entail translating column headers from a technical specification to names that are more descriptive. More creative approaches are certainly possible. However, a concern is that data controllers might use the way information is presented to attempt to minimize or reduce the prominence of data they consider inconvenient. It should be emphasized that regardless of the format chosen for presenting data, all data should be returned and that controllers must not mislead data subjects about what data are being processed.
Portability necessarily involves representing the data in a technical format. The GDPR's requirement that data provided in response to portability requests are given in a structured, commonly used format gives fewer possibilities for curation. However, even a technical representation need not include extraneous system-related data (e.g., software version numbers), nor use the same descriptors as the actual underlying system. Indeed, requirements for portable data to be in a common format could well make such extraneous or specific information inappropriate.
Further, there could also be a scope for making the data more technically useful rather than strictly representing the data of the underlying technical system.
Standards and Practices
The development of standards and best practices as they relate to serving requests will encourage firms to consider and develop processes for fulfilling data requests. It will also entail some translation (and thought) in mapping the local data, systems, and processes to that of the standard. This can help either explicitly, where implementing a standard provides an opportunity for the organization to consider the security risks as it defines its policy, and also implicitly, where adhering to the standard might naturally work to obfuscate some of the underlying details, including removing the inclusion of extraneous metadata that could otherwise be revealed through technical dumps. Ideally, security considerations should feature as part of any rights-oriented standards development processes.
Interoperability Standards. Though standards and the translations they entail can generally assist such issues, they are especially relevant for the right to portability. The motivation for the right is to encourage competition as a means to enable data subjects to migrate to other services (controllers) should they wish to. The right to portability, as explained in Art. 20, requires controllers to provide data in a technical format and, where possible, to enable a controller to directly transfer the subject's data to another service. Interoperability standards are already being discussed as a means to facilitate both these aspects. Indeed, the GDPR suggests that data controllers should be encouraged to develop interoperability standards (Recital 68), and supervisory authorities may have a role to play.
Platform-based approaches to common standards are beginning to emerge. For example, there is the Data Transfer Project (see https://datatransferproject.dev/), which is an open source project primarily led by the tech giants. Its key aim is to facilitate the direct transfer aspect of the right to portability, by enabling the transfer of data directly between service providers. Security is mentioned as a key consideration. Though a direct transfer regime brings efficiency and can preclude disclosing the raw data back to data subjects (if the subjects desire direct transfer), subjects still maintain the right under portability to have access to this information. As portability platforms develop, facilitating transfer necessarily requires standards and processes to be implemented, again providing opportunities for organizations to consider and reduce their security risks.
Emerging Best Practice. There are also projects underway that aim at providing platforms to assist data subjects in exercising their rights through information and tooling (for an indicative list, see https://datarights .wiki/index.php/List_of_all_access_request_projects). In line with the awareness aspect already discussed, these subject-oriented, i.e., people-focused, platforms also bring visibility over the practices of a number of organizations by operating across them. In turn, this can encourage better practices (de facto standards) through coordinating subject demands and by providing a place where controllers can learn from others as to the appropriate (and inappropriate) information to include in requests.
More generally, organizations do not operate in isolation, and knowledge and approaches are often shared. Therefore, it may also be beneficial for data controllers to exchange and share knowledge of practices in relation to data subject rights and security, perhaps through professional or industry bodies as well as through more informal forums. This would allow experience and knowledge to transfer between organizations, ideally raising the standards of industry as a whole. D ata subject rights are a fundamental aspect of data protection regulations. And while organizations increasingly recognize the importance of cybersecurity, so far there has been little discussion regarding the security implications of data subject rights. Here we have argued that controllers should consider and account for the possible security risks as they fulfill rights requests. It has been observed that there are tensions between privacy mechanisms and exercising rights, 11, 14 where confidentiality mechanisms can inhibit rights fulfillment. What we have discussed is in a similar space. However, our focus is on where fulfilling rights requests has resulting security implications. To reiterate, this should not be considered a tradeoff between rights and security, not only because of the importance of rights but also because many risks can be mitigated through integrating some security thinking into the methods and processes by which rights are fulfilled. Rather, awareness seems the key concern. To date, there appears to be little discussion of such issues. And although improvements may occur naturally as organizational approaches to data protection mature, at present, rights-related security issues warrant greater attention.
In all, this appears to be an opportunity. A more security-oriented approach to rights fulfilment works to improve controller security, which, in turn, can help prevent attacks, hacks, and possible breaches that can have wide-reaching consequences for data subjects, controllers, and beyond. At the same time, forcing more attention on the way information is delivered to data subjects also provides an opening to consider how such responses can be more useful and meaningful. 
